

## **Features and types of governmental cabinets as descriptors of semi-presidential system of government in European countries**

The article deals with the essence and attributes of semi-presidential system of government, mainly in European countries, in particular on the basis of outlining and operationalising the features and types of governmental cabinets as a descriptor of semi-presidentialism. On this basis, the author found a correlation between the influence of the institutions of the head of state and parliament on the formation of different types of governmental cabinets in countries with semi-presidential system of government. It is clear that party governmental cabinets (primarily majority, not minority ones and coalition rather than single-party ones), which are the predominant characteristic of the countries whose political regimes are democratic ones, are dominant in European semi-presidential countries. Instead, non-party governmental cabinets are rare and are the characteristic of semi-presidential countries with mainly undemocratic (autocratic or hybrid) political regimes (including presidential or president-oriented governmental cabinets), but less often with democratic political regimes (particularly as technocratic governmental cabinets).

*Keywords: semi-presidentialism, governmental cabinet, president, parliament, European countries.*

## **Cechy i typy gabinetów rządowych jako deskryptory półprezydenckiego systemu rządów w krajach europejskich**

Artykuł dotyczy istoty i atrybutów półprezydenckiego systemu rządów, głównie w krajach europejskich, w szczególności na podstawie zarysu i operacjonalizacji cech i typów gabinetów rządowych jako deskryptora półprezydenckiego systemu. Autor znajduje korelację między wpływem instytucji głowy państwa i parlamentu na kształtowanie się różnego rodzaju gabinetów rządowych w krajach o systemie półprezydenckim. Można dostrzec, że gabinety partyjne (przede wszystkim większościowe, nie mniejszościowe i raczej większościowe i koalicyjne niż jednopartyjne), które są dominującą cechą krajów o ustrojach demokratycznych, dominują w europejskich krajach półprezydenckich. Gabinety rządowe niepartyjne występują rzadko i są charakterystyczne głównie dla krajów o systemach półprezydenckich z niedemokratycznymi (autokratycznymi lub hybrydowymi) reżimami politycznymi (w tym prezydenckimi lub zorientowanymi na prezydenta gabinetami rządowymi), rzadziej jednak z demokratycznymi reżimami politycznymi (zwłaszcza jako technokratyczne gabinety rządowe).

*Słowa kluczowe: półprezydenccjalizm, gabinet, prezydent, parlament, kraje europejskie.*

## Особливості та типи урядових кабінетів як дескриптори напівпрезидентської системи правління в країнах Європи

У статті проаналізовано сутність й атрибути напівпрезидентської системи правління, головню в країнах Європи, зокрема на підставі окреслення й операціоналізації особливостей і типів урядових кабінетів як дескриптора напівпрезиденталізму. На цій підставі засвідчено взаємну кореляцію впливу інститутів глави держави та парламенту на формування різних типів урядових кабінетів у країнах з напівпрезидентською системою правління. Встановлено, що у європейських напівпрезидентських країнах переважаючими є партійні урядові кабінети (передусім більшості, а не меншості, коаліційні, а не однопартійні), які переважно властиві для країн, політичні режими яких є демократичними. Натомість непартійні урядові кабінети трапляються зрідка та притаманні для напівпрезидентських країн переважно з недемократичними (автократичними або гібридними) політичними режимами (зокрема як президентські чи президент-орієнтовані урядові кабінети) і рідше з демократичними політичними режимами (зокрема як технократичні урядові кабінети).

*Ключові слова:* напівпрезиденталізм, урядовий кабінет, президент, парламент, країни Європи.

Semi-presidentialism is a system of government where the role, status and types of governmental cabinets are very important (if not decisive) in outlining the political process. This is clear from the definition and attribution of semi-presidentialism – as a system of government with a popularly elected president and a governmental cabinet headed by a prime minister, who are necessarily collectively responsible to parliament – and from the nature, manner of popular election and powers of presidents as well as the structure of the legitimacy of the executive. In this context, it is important to take into account the peculiarities of the formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets, which directly or indirectly determine the features and types of governmental cabinets as descriptors of semi-presidential system of government, including in European countries. The proposed scientific research is focused on this issue.

The specified issue is largely developed in the scientific achievements of many researchers. They state that the formative, terminal or discretionary patterns of functioning of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are largely derived from the influence and powers of the heads of state, although, on the other hand, they are necessarily dependent on the legislatures, as a result they quite specifically determine the analysed system of government<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Kang S.-G. Government Formation and Termination in European Democracies with Presidential Heads of State. Rochester: University of Rochester, 2008. 352 p.; Kang S.-G. The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence // European Journal of Political Research. 2009. Vol. 48. No. 4. P. 543–572.

The explanation is that voters theoretically (but not always actually) have two channels and mechanisms for controlling governmental cabinet and the executive: the first or initial one – through parliament, and the second or alternative one – through president. As a result, the study of the influence of legislatures and presidents on the formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is important normatively and practically, since it can testify to institutional, procedural, political and behavioural attributes of one or another type of constitutional design. This is especially valuable through the prism of taking into account the party determination and composition/affiliation of the heads of state, parliaments and governmental cabinets<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, as noted by P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones<sup>3</sup>, as well as O. Amorim Neto and K. Strom<sup>4</sup>, it is noticeable that the nature of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is or may be conflictual, bilateral or dualistic one, especially based on the contradictions between the mandates of presidents and legislatures. Therefore, it can lead to exceptional consequences, in particular to the involvement of non-party ministers in governmental cabinets or to the formation of non-party governmental cabinets in general<sup>5</sup>. In summary, this regulates that the governmental cabinets' formation process and the responsibilities of governmental cabinets in semi-presidential systems of government are dynamic ones and are based on the interaction between presidents and legislatures (i.e. parliamentary parties), as well as between the results of their elections<sup>6</sup>. The latter are capable of causing and/or intensifying the conflicts within the executive and the constitutional ambiguity of semi-presidentialism in general<sup>7</sup>.

According to O. Protsyk<sup>8</sup>, this is determined by the fact that semi-presidential system of government is characterised by the participation of president and parliament in the election/formation and/or responsibility of governmental cabinet. As a result, the decisions of president and parliament to appoint governmental cabinet can be simulated as a two-way/bilateral game

<sup>2</sup> Austen-Smith D., Banks J. Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes // *American Political Science Review*. 1988. Vol. 82. P. 405–422.; Baron D. A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems // *American Political Science Review*. 1991. Vol. 85. No. 1. P. 137–164.; Baron D. Government Formation and Endogenous Parties // *American Political Science Review*. 1993. Vol. 87. No. 1. P. 34–47.; Baron D., Diermeier D. Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems // *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 2001. Vol. 116. No. 3. P. 933–967.; Laver M., Shepsle K. Coalitions and Cabinet Government // *American Political Science Review*. 1990. Vol. 84. No. 3. P. 873–890.; Sened I. A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence // *Journal of Politics*. 1996. Vol. 58. No. 2. P. 350–372.

<sup>3</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E. Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or Generating Representation and Governance Problems? // Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC. September 1–4, 2005. 29 p.

<sup>4</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strom K. Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies // *British Journal of Political Science*. 2006. Vol. 36. No. 4. P. 619–643.

<sup>5</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strom K. Breaking the Chain: The Impact of Presidents on Cabinet Selection in European Parliamentary Democracies // Paper prepared for delivery at the Conference on Electoral Reform in Brazil in Comparative Perspective. Rio de Janeiro, 2002.; Almeida A., Cho S.-J. Presidential Power and Cabinet Membership Under Semi-Presidentialism // Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago. April 3–6, 2003. 42 p.

<sup>6</sup> Kang S.-G. Government Formation and Termination in European Democracies with Presidential Heads of State. Rochester: University of Rochester, 2008. 352 p.

<sup>7</sup> Movchan U. Dualizm vykonavchoi vlady: problema rozpodilu povnovazhen u napivprezidentskykh systemakh // *Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. N. Karazina. Seriya: Pytannia politolohii*. 2011. # 984. S. 102–108.

<sup>8</sup> Protsyk O. Prime ministers' identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2005. Vol. 44. No. 5. P. 724.

on arrangements about it. For example, when a hypothetical prime minister (or governmental cabinet formator) focuses on an unstable majority in the legislature, and the president realises that he or she does not have the support of any majority in the legislature, there is a situation when the only way out is to form a kind of “mixed” or non-party governmental cabinet. This form of the distribution of governmental cabinet’s portfolios forms the basis for the fact that the president and prime minister, having loyal or apolitical representatives among ministers, will see in them their own sphere of influence on each other and on the decisions and actions of each of them<sup>9</sup>. This is especially true in the cases of reaching a compromise and the nomination of some ministers from the presidential/pro-presidential political party and some ministers from the political party of a hypothetical prime minister/formator or from outside the parties in the legislature.

Such a situation regarding the formation of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is supplemented by taking into account the factor of who can dismiss governmental cabinet, i.e. only parliament or both parliament and president. When the right to terminate governmental cabinet belongs only to parliament then president is faced with an “interinstitutional choice”: either to appoint a prime minister who reflects the preferences of legislature, or to nominate a close candidate for a prime minister and to be prepared for the fact that legislature will be able to dismiss this prime minister at any time and to change the president-oriented governmental cabinet. Quite different strategies emerge when president and parliament can unilaterally dismiss prime minister and governmental cabinet. On the one hand, since president has the right to dismiss governmental cabinet, this fact gives him or her an advantage in the process of governmental cabinet’s formation. On the other hand, ensuring the election of prime minister and governmental cabinet, that are more acceptable to parliament, does not necessarily guarantee their long term in office, since loyalty to them in parliament could be jeopardised by the need to live up to any president’s hopes<sup>10</sup>. The outlined situations, regardless of the scenario and the process of governmental cabinets’ formation, are complicated by the threat of permanent revision and redistribution of powers of prime ministers and presidents, especially in the institutional cases that have only recently become semi-presidential ones<sup>11</sup>. This conflict in the process of governmental cabinet’s formation under semi-presidentialism is compounded by the fact that president and prime minister (along with ministers) can be oppositional figures not only if they belong to different political parties, but also if they belong to the same political party. Moreover, the definition of the role of president in the process of governmental cabinet formation can be also outlined by the clientelistic structure of party system (which is characterised by

<sup>9</sup> Movchan U. Dualizm vykonavchoi vlady: problema rozpodilu povnovazhen u napivprezidentskykh systemakh // Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V.N. Karazina: Seriya: Pytannia politolohii. 2011. # 984. S. 102–108.

<sup>10</sup> Protsyk O. Prime ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes // European Journal of Political Research. 2005. Vol. 44. No. 5. P. 726–727.

<sup>11</sup> Elgie R. The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism // Elgie R. Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. P. 1–21.; Elgie R. Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering // Elgie R. Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. P. 281–299.; Taras R. Postcommunist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 250 p.

private distribution among the members of the ruling group of public power sphere<sup>12</sup>), as well as by the structuring of party system in general (including its fractionalisation or fragmentation, polarisation, dimensionality, etc.). For example, Political Science<sup>13</sup> argues that the more the party of the head of state is distanced from the ideological centre of inter-party competition, the more likely it is that its representative will be prime minister and vice versa.

Accordingly, it is crucial to focus on the causal link between the resignations of the current and the formation of new governmental cabinets, both by legislatures and presidents, as well as in the context of the competitiveness of political parties. They can largely theorise the conditions of formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets, as well as explain the reasons and statistics of the formation of different types of governmental cabinets and different ministerial composition of governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. This, in turn, can theoretically, methodologically and empirically testify to the variability of semi-presidentialism, in particular to the mutual correlation of the influence of the institutions of the head of state and parliament on the formation of different types of governmental cabinets.

According to cross-national and cross-temporal statistics on the formation of different types of governmental cabinets in European semi-presidential countries (see Table 1 for details), party governmental cabinets are predominant ones in the analysed sample. On average, they make up almost 90 percent of all governmental cabinets created under semi-presidentialism, and are predominantly inherent to the countries whose political regimes are democratic ones. As for non-party governmental cabinets, they have traditionally been formed or are being formed in semi-presidential countries with undemocratic (autocratic or hybrid) political regimes, in particular in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Russia and Ukraine, and much less often or even situationally (for needs) in democracies with semi-presidential system of government, in particular in Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Portugal and Romania. Among party governmental cabinets, the European semi-presidentialism is dominated by, on the one hand, majority cabinets (64 percent of all governmental cabinets, with 24,7 percent of minority governmental cabinets) and, on the other hand, coalition cabinets (71,9 percent of all governmental cabinets, with 16,8 percent of single-party governmental cabinets). The exceptions are Armenia (1995–2005), Bulgaria, Croatia (since 2000), Moldova and Romania, where minority governmental cabinets predominate or previously prevailed among party governmental cabinets, and Croatia (1991–2000), Georgia (2004–2013), Portugal (since 1982) and Turkey, where single-party governmental cabinets predominate or previously prevailed among party cabinets. In general, among all party governmental cabinets in the European semi-presidentialism, the most common

<sup>12</sup> Fisun A. *Demokratyia, neopatriymonializm i globalnye transformatsii: monohrafiya*. Kharkov: Konstanta, 2006. S. 169–170.

<sup>13</sup> Kang S.-G. *Government Formation and Termination in European Democracies with Presidential Heads of State*. Rochester: University of Rochester, 2008. 352 p.; Mitchell P., Nyblade B. *Government Formation and Cabinet Type* // Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 201–236.

type are coalition majority governmental cabinets<sup>14</sup>, and the least common type are single-party majority governmental cabinets and single-party minority governmental cabinets. Somewhat distinctive logic is inherent to: Croatia (in 1991–2000), Georgia (in 2004–2013) and Turkey, where single-party majority governmental cabinets are the most common type; for Armenia (1995–2005), Moldova (since 2016) and Portugal (since 1982), where single-party minority governmental cabinets are or have been the most common ones; for Romania and Montenegro (2006–2007), where minority coalition governmental cabinets are or have been the most common ones; Bulgaria, where single-party minority governmental cabinets and majority coalition governmental cabinets are most common ones; Croatia (since 2000) and Slovakia, where majority and minority coalition governmental cabinets are or have been the most common ones. Ireland is characterised by the fact that different types of party governmental cabinets were formed with approximately the same frequency during 1937–2016. As for the imposition of electoral risks and the peculiarities of the responsibility of different types of party governmental cabinets on the frequency of their formation in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, it is obviously, as J.-W. Lin<sup>15</sup> argues, that: the probability and frequency of formation of majority governmental cabinets decreases with the use of proportional electoral systems, but increases with the use of majority electoral systems for the election of legislatures; the likelihood and frequency of the formation of majority governmental cabinets decreases when presidents can unilaterally appoint prime ministers; the probability and frequency of the formation of majority governmental cabinets decreases as the constitutional and political powers of presidents increase.

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<sup>14</sup> Golder S., Thomas J. Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence // *British Journal of Political Science*. 2014. Vol. 44. No. 1. P. 29–39.

<sup>15</sup> Lin J.-W. The Rules of Electoral Competition and the Accountability of Semi-Presidential Governments // Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*. London: Palgrave, 2011. P. 61–80.

**Table 1.** Types of governmental cabinets in the cases of European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2016)<sup>16</sup>

Country (period)	Number of all govern. cabinets	From all governmental cabinets		From all governmental cabinets		From all governmental cabinets		From all governmental cabinets			
		Number / percentage of party govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of non-party govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of majority govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of minority govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of single-party govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of coalition govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of majority single-party govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of minority single-party govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of majority coalition govern. cabinets	Number / percentage of minority coalition govern. cabinets
Armenia (1995–2005)	8	4 / 50,0	4 / 50,0	1 / 12,5	3 / 37,5	2 / 25,0	2 / 25,0	0 / 0	2 / 25,0	1 / 12,5	1 / 12,5
Armenia (2005–2016)	8	8 / 100	0 / 0	7 / 87,5	1 / 12,5	0 / 0	8 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	7 / 87,5	1 / 12,5
Austria (1945–2016)	35	35 / 100	0 / 0	33 / 94,3	2 / 5,7	5 / 14,3	30 / 85,7	3 / 8,6	2 / 5,7	29 / 82,8	1 / 2,9
Azerbaijan (1995–2016)	6	0 / 0	6 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0
Belarus (1996–2016)	7	0 / 0	7 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–2016)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Bulgaria (1991–2016)	13	9 / 69,2	4 / 30,8	4 / 30,8	5 / 38,4	4 / 30,8	5 / 38,4	1 / 7,7	3 / 23,1	3 / 23,1	2 / 15,4
Croatia (1991–2000)	4	4 / 100	0 / 0	4 / 100	0 / 0	3 / 75,0	1 / 25,0	3 / 75,0	0 / 0	1 / 25,0	0 / 0
Croatia (2000–2016)	11	11 / 100	0 / 0	5 / 45,45	6 / 54,55	1 / 9,1	10 / 90,9	0 / 0	1 / 9,1	5 / 45,45	5 / 45,45
Czech Republic (2012–2016)	3	2 / 66,7	1 / 33,3	2 / 66,7	0 / 0	0 / 0	2 / 66,7	0 / 0	0 / 0	2 / 66,7	0 / 0

<sup>16</sup> The table is based on own calculations and existing statistics, but as of December 2016. At the same time, in 2017 and 2020, respectively, it was known about the change of the methods of electing presidents from popular to non-popular ones and thus the systems of government from semi-presidential to parliamentary ones in Armenia and Georgia, but as of 2016 they remained semi-presidential ones because no non-popular elections of presidents were held. It was also known about the change from semi-presidentialism to presidentialism in Turkey in 2017, but formally Turkey remained a semi-presidential republic as of 2016.

Finland (1919–1999)	65	57/87,7	8/12,3	35/53,85	22/33,85	6/9,25	51/78,45	0/0	6/9,25	35/53,85	16/24,6
Finland (1999–2016)	11	11/100	0/0	11/100	0/0	0/0	11/100	0/0	0/0	11/100	0/0
France (1962–2016)	38	38/100	0/0	30/78,9	8/21,1	5/13,15	33/86,85	1/2,6	4/10,55	29/76,3	4/10,55
Georgia (2004–2013)	8	8/100	0/0 (7/87,5) <sup>17</sup>	8/100	0/0	7/87,5	1/12,5	7/87,5	0/0	1/12,5	0/0
Georgia (2013–2016)	6	6/100	0/0 (2/33,3) <sup>18</sup>	6/100	0/0	2/33,3	4/66,7	2/33,3	0/0	4/66,7	0/0
Iceland (1944–2016)	34	34/100	0/0	28/82,4	6/17,6	4/11,75	30/88,25	0/0	4/11,75	28/82,4	2/5,85
Ireland (1937–2016)	30	30/100	0/0	15/50,0	15/50,0	13/43,4	17/56,7	7/23,3	6/20,0	8/26,7	9/30,0
Lithuania (1992–2016)	16	16/100	0/0	11/68,75	5/31,25	3/18,75	13/81,25	3/18,75	0/0	8/50,0	5/31,25
Macedonia (1991–2016)	21	21/100	0/0	21/100	0/0	0/0	21/100	0/0	0/0	21/100	0/0
Moldova (2016 p.)	1	1/100	0/0	0/0	1/100	0/0	1/100	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/100
Montenegro (2006–2007)	1	1/100	0/0	1/100	0/0	0/0	1/100	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/100
Montenegro (2007–2016)	9	9/100	0/0	9/100	0/0	0/0	9/100	0/0	0/0	9/100	0/0
Poland (1990–1997)	9	9/100	0/0	6/66,7	3/33,3	1/11,1	8/88,9	0/0	1/11,1	6/66,7	2/22,2
Poland (1997–2016)	12	12/0	0/0	9/75,0	2/25,0	2/16,7	10/83,3	1/8,3	1/8,3	8/66,7	2/16,7
Portugal (1976–1982)	9	8/88,9	1/11,1	4/44,4	4/44,4	3/33,3	5/55,6	0/0	3/33,3	4/44,4	1/11,1

<sup>17</sup> Almost all governmental cabinets were partly non-party and partly single-party ones, although they were supported by single-party parliamentary majorities.

<sup>18</sup> Some governmental cabinets were partly non-party and partly single-party ones, although they were supported by single-party parliamentary majorities.



Portugal (1982–2016)	14	14 / 100	0 / 0	7 / 50,0	7 / 50,0	9 / 64,3	5 / 35,7	3 / 21,4	6 / 42,9	4 / 28,6	1 / 7,1
Romania (1991–2016)	21	20 / 95,2	1 / 4,8	6 / 28,5	14 / 66,7	3 / 14,3	17 / 80,9	0 / 0	3 / 14,3	6 / 28,5	11 / 52,4
Russia (1993–2016)	12	0 / 0	12 / 100 <sup>19</sup>	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0
Serbia (2006–2016)	8	8 / 100	0 / 0	7 / 87,5	1 / 12,5	0 / 0	8 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	7 / 87,5	1 / 12,5
Slovakia (1999–2016)	9	9 / 100	0 / 0	5 / 55,55	4 / 44,45	1 / 11,1	8 / 88,9	1 / 11,1	0 / 0	4 / 44,45	4 / 44,45
Slovenia (1991–2016)	16	16 / 100	0 / 0	12 / 75,0	4 / 25,0	0 / 0	16 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	12 / 75,0	4 / 25,0
Turkey (2007–2016)	6	6 / 100	0 / 0	6 / 100	0 / 0	5 / 83,3	1 / 16,7	5 / 83,3	0 / 0	1 / 16,7	0 / 0
Ukraine (1996–2006)	7	0 / 0	7 / 100 <sup>20</sup>	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0
Ukraine (2006–2010)	4	4 / 100 <sup>21</sup>	0 / 0	4 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	4 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	4 / 100	0 / 0
Ukraine (2010–2014)	2	0 / 0	2 / 100 <sup>22</sup>	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0
Ukraine (2014–2016)	5	5 / 100 <sup>23</sup>	0 / 0	5 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	5 / 100	0 / 0	0 / 0	5 / 100	0 / 0
Total	469	416 / 88,7	53 / 11,3	300 / 64,0	116 / 24,7	79 / 16,8	337 / 71,9	37 / 7,9	42 / 9,0	263 / 56,0	74 / 15,8

Source: The table is based on own calculations and existing statistics. Additionally see: Ieraci G., Poropat F. *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*. EUT Edizionil'Università di Trieste, 2013. 90 p. URL: [http://www.opensciences.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/91957/1/WP-DISES-4-2013\\_full-text.pdf](http://www.opensciences.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/91957/1/WP-DISES-4-2013_full-text.pdf); Döring H., Manow P. *Parliaments and governments database (ParGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version // ParGov*. URL: <http://www.par.gov.org/>; Armingeon K., Wenger V., Wiedemeier F., Weisstanner D., Isler C., Knipfel L. *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2015 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member countries)*. Bern: Institute of Political Science, 2017. URL: <http://www.cps-data.org/index.php/data/Cabinets//PartySystemsandGovernmentsObservatory>. URL: <http://whogovs.eu/>; Balobolskiy Z. *Stabilnist efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: monohrafiia*. Lviv: Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2013. 469 s.

<sup>19</sup> All governmental cabinets logically were non-party ones, although some of them were headed by party prime ministers and supported by single-party parliamentary majorities.

<sup>20</sup> Almost all governmental cabinets were non-party ones or partly non-party and party party ones, and were supported by parliamentary majorities of various parties.

<sup>21</sup> In their logics, governmental cabinets were party/coalitional ones (that met the requirements of the Ukrainian constitution), but consisted of party and non-party ministers.

<sup>22</sup> Governmental cabinets were composed of party (mostly from only one party) and non-party ministers, but were presidential or non-party ones in their logics.

<sup>23</sup> In their logics, governmental cabinets were party/coalitional ones (that met the requirements of the Ukrainian constitution), but consisted of party and non-party ministers.

This, in turn, is the basis for raising the question about the conditionality of the formation of non-party governmental cabinets in various semi-presidential countries of Europe (as well as the question about the nature of non-party governmental cabinets in general)<sup>24</sup>. As follows from the ideas of Z. Bialoblotskyi<sup>25</sup> (mostly based on the analysis of Eastern European countries, where non-party governmental cabinets are formed or have been formed most often), it is necessary to distinguish two temporal sets of countries where such governmental cabinets are used: 1) countries, in which non-party governmental cabinets have or have had permanent use (and are or have been most often positioned as presidential ones) – Armenia (until 2005), Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine (in 1996–2006 and 2010–2014), as well as partially Georgia (until 2013); 2) countries, in which the formation of non-party governmental cabinets is or was an exception to the practice of party governments' formation (these are the countries with a parliamentary model of governmental cabinet formation) – Bulgaria, Finland, Portugal, Romania and the Czech Republic. Moreover, the permanence or impermanence of non-party governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism has also, as partially mentioned above, its initial variability. The formation of such type of governmental cabinets is often caused by some-constitutional attributes of political systems (it is about non-parliamentary or incompletely parliamentary way of the formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets, which necessarily “begins” and “ends” with presidential elections in some countries), political regimes (since it is observed that non-party governmental cabinets are more often formed in autocratic and hybrid (or in general in undemocratic) political regimes), political traditions (regardless of political regime and system of government), the desire to implement socio-economic transformations, and so on.

This reveals that due to the political practice of semi-presidentialism, two scenarios of non-party governmental cabinets' initiating and formation are noticeable: 1) based on the process of presidentialisation of systems of government in countries, where presidents are considered to be the main political actors and parliaments are complementary political actors in the formation and resignation of governmental cabinets; 2) based on the agreement between presidents and politically unstructured/unstable majority in legislatures, which is traditionally the main political actor in the formation and resignation of governmental cabinets. This means that in some semi-presidential systems non-party governmental cabinets are more “presidential” ones (especially in the case of Eastern Europe), while in other semi-presidential systems they are more “parliamentary” ones (in other European countries). In addition, in different semi-presidential systems,

<sup>24</sup> Tucker A. From republican virtue to technology of political power: three episodes of Czech nonpolitical politics // *Political Science Quarterly*. 2000. Vol. 115. No. 3. P. 421–445.; Amorim Neto O., Costa Lobo M. Portugal's Semi-Presidentialism (Re)considered: An Assessment of the President's Role in the Policy Process, 1976–2006 // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2009. Vol. 48. No. 2. P. 234–255.; Halleberg M., Wehner J. The Technical Competence of Economic Policy-Makers in Developed Democracies. SSRN Working Papers. 2018. 47 p.; McDonnell D., Valbruzzi M. Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2014. Vol. 53. No. 4. P. 654–671.; Pastorella G. Why have technocrats been appointed to govern European democracies? // *UACES General Conference*. Panel “Public opinion, representation and citizenship: political parties, distrust, and compliance”. Cork, September 2014. 20 p.

<sup>25</sup> Bialoblotskyi Z. *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: monohrafiia*. Lviv: Vydavnychyi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2013. 469 s.

non-party governmental cabinets provide quite divergent articulation of political interests: 1) in the first case, the articulation of political interests of non-party governmental cabinets is virtually invisible and impossible, because governmental cabinets in their “survival” largely depends on the positions of presidents in such scenarios; 2) in the second case, the articulation of political interests of non-party governmental cabinets is weak, except in the cases of socio-economic and political crises, because the cohesion of legislatures is weakened in such scenarios. In summary, this reflects that non-party governmental cabinets under semi-presidential environment contribute, albeit in different ways, to an additional and political increase in the powers of the heads of state.

At the same time, the specificity of non-party governmental cabinets in semi-presidential systems, where such cabinets’ constructions occur permanently, is that they are determined by the peculiarities of party and electoral systems, political regimes and systems of government. The fact is that all the stated requirements and factors are summarised to determine the special role of the head of state in the processes of formation and resignation of governmental cabinets. Thus, the peculiarities of the formation of non-party governmental cabinets are marked by the fact that this type of cabinets makes it possible to informally elevate the already and a priori strong presidential powers<sup>26</sup>. With this in mind, by forming non-party governmental cabinets, in particular by influencing the selection of governmental ministers, presidents gain additional influence in determining the political process. This means that the prevalence of non-party ministers is justified if president wants to preserve powers provided for him or her. In addition, it has a positive effect on the hypothetical re-election of the incumbent head of state, thereby significantly limiting the chances of the incumbent prime minister (or any other power-sharing actor) to become a president. This is how the informal “autocratisation” of political regime is intensifying, that is why researchers often link non-party governmental cabinets to the existence of autocratic and hybrid political regimes<sup>27</sup>.

The outlined attribute of the importance and role of non-party governmental cabinets is especially relevant in semi-presidential autocracies, where prime minister has little prospect of winning presidency as a result of a hypothetical election victory. The softening of the “personalism” of the head of state’s power (based on the formation of non-party governmental cabinets by presidents) takes place in hybrid and some autocratic semi-presidential systems, where prime minister is the part of a “power” cohort (i.e. the group of “security officers”) of the executive vertical<sup>28</sup>. The fact is that prime minister is often or sometimes given an incentive to increase his or her political weight in the context of electoral preferences before presidential election in such systems. Accordingly, non-party governmental cabinets in this case serve as a tool for

<sup>26</sup> Bialoblotskyi Z. Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: monohrafia. Lviv: Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2013. 469 s.

<sup>27</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strøm K. Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies // *British Journal of Political Science*. 2006. Vol. 36. No. 4. P. 619–643.

<sup>28</sup> Bialoblotskyi Z. Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: monohrafia. Lviv: Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2013. 469 s.

transforming the ideas of representative democracy into the idea of delegative or personal dictatorship, when there is no chain of delegation of powers and responsibilities based on the systemic cohesion of political parties inherent in representative democracy. Instead, it is quite controversial in the case of the formation of non-party governmental cabinets in those semi-presidential systems where these institutional structures are situational. The reason is that non-party governmental cabinets in such those semi-presidential systems most often occur when politicians, representing different political orientations or parties, cannot agree on the formation of a governmental cabinet on a traditional party basis and the dissolution of parliament is considered as undesirable one.

The theoretical and methodological consequence is that in one case (in some cases of semi-presidentialism) non-party governmental cabinets are positioned as presidential or president-oriented ones<sup>29</sup>, and in another case (in other cases of semi-presidentialism) – as technocratic or expert-oriented ones. There is a significant difference between them, as prime minister is not a career politician (although he or she may be affiliated with a particular political party) in both the first and second scenarios. However, in the first scenario (unlike the second scenario), governmental ministers are not necessarily experts within governmental portfolios and domains delegated to them, they are not necessarily independent of the head of state, prime minister, governmental cabinet formator and their parties, and governmental cabinets are not necessarily neutral in constructing the agenda and do not always reflect election results and voter preferences. Instead, they are synthesised by the fact that they are traditionally formed without the active (as usual) participation of legislatures, without taking into account (or only partially taking into account) their party and personnel composition, and therefore they consist of more than 50 percent of non-party ministers<sup>30</sup>.

In summary and taking into account the electoral and non-electoral risks of the formation and resignation of governmental cabinets (as such) in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, it is argued that: a) majority (one- or two-round) electoral systems (in the context of the election of national legislatures) mostly “support” the permanent formation of non-party governmental cabinets, and proportional or mixed electoral systems do not provide or very rarely provide non-party governmental cabinets; b) the number of non-party governmental cabinets and non-party ministers increases from democratic to hybrid political regimes, and the highest one is in autocratic political regimes. It is also obvious that the growth of the number of non-party ministers (in party and non-party governmental cabinets) in the conditions of semi-presidentialism depends on such factors as: a) increase of constitutionally regulated and politically motivated powers of presidents (the larger they are, the more often non-party ministers

<sup>29</sup> Ström K., Müller W., Bergman T. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. P. 559.; Kuusisto A. *Parliamentary Crises and Presidential Government in Finland* // *Parliamentary Affairs*. 1958. Vol. 11. No. 3. P. 341.; Raunio T. *The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints* // *Scandinavian Political Studies*. 2004. Vol. 27. No. 2. P. 133–152.

<sup>30</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E. *Who's in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets* // *Comparative Political Studies*. 2010. Vol. 43. No. 11. P. 1424.

are involved into governmental cabinets<sup>31</sup>, as a result of which the levers of influence of presidents themselves increase in parallel or additionally<sup>32</sup>); b) increase of fractionalisation and clientelism of party systems (since the inability to form a governmental cabinet on the basis of presidential party or on party basis in general leads to the fact that president in semi-presidentialism can use direct or unilateral tools to influence the political process and positioning of governmental cabinet<sup>33</sup>); c) decrease of professionalisation of party-bureaucratic apparatus (since the head of governmental cabinet and the head of state in the conditions of semi-presidentialism should be more concerned about the need for political expertise of the decisions of governmental cabinet<sup>34</sup>); d) deterioration (negative state) of the economic situation in country<sup>35</sup>; e) weakening the level of democratisation of country or development of country in the autocratic direction (through the weakening of party system)<sup>36</sup>.

In general, the study states: that the complication of the rules for accepting investiture votes in new governmental cabinets by legislature strengthens the government-formation power of the latter; the complication of the rules for adopting no-confidence votes against the current governmental cabinets on the part of legislatures weakens the government-formation power of the latter; the complication of the rules for adopting votes of confidence in current governmental cabinets by legislatures strengthens the government-formation power of the latter. This shows the mutual correlation of the influence of the institutions of the head of state and parliament on the formation of different types of governmental cabinets. At the same time, it is purely statistically found that party governmental cabinets (primarily majority, not minority ones and coalition rather

<sup>31</sup> Amorim Neto O., Ström K. Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies // *British Journal of Political Science*. 2006. Vol. 36. No. 4. P. 619–643.; Pastorella G. Why have technocrats been appointed to govern European democracies? // UACES General Conference. Panel “Public opinion, representation and citizenship: political parties, distrust, and compliance”. Cork, September 2014. 20 p.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E. Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2009. Vol. 48. No. 5. P. 665.; Pastorella G. Technocratic Governments: Power, Expertise and Crisis Politics in European Democracies: PhD thesis. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2016. 284 p.

<sup>32</sup> Baylis T. Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe // *World Politics*. 1996. Vol. 48. No. 3. P. 297–323.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E. Constitutional power and competing risks: Monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, and the termination of East and West European cabinets // *American Political Science Review*. 2009. Vol. 103. No. 3. P. 496–512.; Amorim Neto O. The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas // *Comparative Political Studies*. 2006. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 423.

<sup>33</sup> Amorim Neto O. The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas // *Comparative Political Studies*. 2006. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 415–440.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E. Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2009. Vol. 48. No. 5. P. 665–693.; Linz J. Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe // Taras R. *Postcommunist Presidents*. Cambridge University Press, 1997. P. 11.; Pastorella G. Why have technocrats been appointed to govern European democracies? // UACES General Conference. Panel “Public opinion, representation and citizenship: political parties, distrust, and compliance”. Cork, September 2014. 20 p.

<sup>34</sup> Peters G. Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who’s Who and Does It Make Any Difference? // Farazmand A. *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*. Sage Publications, 1997. P. 232–254.; Amorim Neto O., Samuels D. Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective // *Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies*. 2010. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 10–23.; Graham L. Transients and Careerists in Latin America // Farazmand A. *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997. P. 212–228.

<sup>35</sup> Amorim Neto O., Samuels D. Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective // *Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies*. 2010. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 10–23.

<sup>36</sup> Protsyk O. Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine // *Practice*. 2005. 9 p.; Protsyk O. Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries // Paper Prepared at NISPAce Conference. Kyiv. May 16–18, 2007. 9 p.

than single-party ones), which are the predominant characteristic of the countries whose political regimes are democratic ones, are prevalent in European semi-presidential countries. Instead, non-party governmental cabinets are rare and are the characteristic of semi-presidential countries with mainly undemocratic (autocratic or hybrid) political regimes (including presidential or president-oriented governmental cabinets), but less often with democratic political regimes (particularly as technocratic governmental cabinets).

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